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Memory evolved to supply useful, timely information to the organism’s decision-making systems.
Therefore, decision rules, multiple memory systems, and the search engines that link them should have
coevolved to mesh in a coadapted, functionally interlocking way. This adaptationist perspective sug-
gested the scope hypothesis: When a generalization is retrieved from semantic memory, episodic
memories that are inconsistent with it should be retrieved in tandem to place boundary conditions on the
scope of the generalization. Using a priming paradigm and a decision task involving person memory, the
authors tested and confirmed this hypothesis. The results support the view that priming is an evolved
adaptation. They further show that dissociations between memory systems are not—and should not
be—absolute: Independence exists for some tasks but not others.
Memory is a gift of nature, the ability of living organisms to retain and
to utilize acquired information or knowledge. . . . Owners of biolog-
ical memory systems are capable of behaving more appropriately at a
later time because of their experiences at an earlier time, a feat not
possible for organisms without memory. (Tulving, 1995a, p. 751)
If there is one proposition on which all psychologists seem to
agree, it is that memory is useful. Memory allows organisms to
adjust their behavior on the basis of information they acquire
ontogenetically, through their experiences with the world.
This connection between personal experience, memory, and
behavior implies a close relationship between learning and mem-
ory: “Memory in biological systems always entails learning (the
acquisition of information) and . . . learning implies retention
(memory) of such information” (Tulving, 1995a, p. 751). Recog-
nizing this, psychologists have long exploited learning paradigms
to study the properties of memory (e.g., by list learning to probe
free recall, cued recall, and recognition).
The same connection also implies a close relationship between
decision rules1 and memory. An organism cannot behave “more
appropriately”—that is, more adaptively—at a later time because
of experiences at an earlier time unless it is equipped with rules
that use ontogenetically acquired information to make decisions.
Indeed, memory systems must have evolved their structure in
response to the informational needs of the decision rules guiding
behavior. This is because memory properties that have no impact
on an organism’s decisions will not be visible to—and hence will
not be shaped by—selection. Moreover, because decision rules
often differ in what information they require, different sets of decision
rules may activate different retrieval processes or search engines and
may access different memory systems or sets of memory systems.
Without engines that can search for and retrieve the right information,
supplying it to the right decision rule at the right time, an organ
designed to store ontogenetically acquired information—that is, a
memory system—would be a pointless appendage.
Hence, adaptive behavior over time depends on a functional,
coadapted relationship between three components: (a) the decision
rules that guide the organism’s behavior, (b) the memory systems
that store the data required by the decision rules, and (c) the search
engines that identify and route the stored information dynamically
to the decision rules that are active. This implies that decision tasks
can be experimentally manipulated to illuminate the designs and
differentiated functions of multiple memory systems, just as learn-
ing paradigms have in the past.2
1 We intend that the term decision rule be interpreted broadly to include
any mechanism that alters behavior on the basis of information (thus it
could apply to an aplysia or pigeon as well as to a human being). Our use
of this term is not meant to endorse or reject any particular proposals about
whether the implementation is symbolic and rule following or subsymbolic
and rule approximating.
2 What do we mean by decision rule and search engine? Researchers
observe organisms making decisions, and making them in a way that is
patterned rather than random. Similarly, researchers also commonly obtain
evidence that information was retrieved from memory. To avoid confusion,
we use the terms decision rule and search engine to distinguish between
observed phenomena (decisions, retrieval) and the hypothesized computa-
tional entities (decision rules, search engines) that are proposed to account
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The search engine component of the triad can be explored in this
way as well, allowing the development and experimental evalua-
tion of alternative theories for why priming was engineered into
the cognitive architecture. So far, priming has been defined as an
experimental phenomenon: Information is said to have been
primed when performing one task changes the availability of that
information for use in a subsequent task. At the most general level,
one family of theories would explain priming as a by-product of
the way the cognitive architecture happens to be organized,
whereas another family of theories would explain priming as
having been specifically engineered into the cognitive architecture
by evolution because of the functional contributions it made to
behaving adaptively. According to this functionalist or adaptation-
ist view, search engines should have evolved to accelerate the
delivery of appropriate information to an activated decision rule.3
Search engines are designed to accomplish this by using current
decision-making operations and events to predict which information
is likely to be required by subsequent decision tasks, and to facilitate
its delivery. As a result, the information that these procedures predict
will be more relevant will be retrieved faster than other information,
and therefore will be more available for use by activated decision
rules. Experimentally, this would produce the observed phenomenon
of priming. By seeing which patterns of priming are deployed by
alternative decision rules, different hypotheses about the designs of
search engines, and of the nature of priming itself, can be tested.
An Adaptationist Approach to Studying Memory
It is often productive to explore experimental results with the
working hypothesis that they are, to some significant extent, the
expression of a functional computational design (e.g., J. R. Ander-
son, 1989, 1991; J. R. Anderson & Milson, 1989; Cosmides &
Tooby, 1987; Sherry & Schacter, 1987). That is, the human cog-
nitive architecture can be interpreted as if it were a relatively well
engineered system, analyzable through the application of such
concepts as function, design features, task analyses, goal of com-
putation, efficiency, reliability, and so on. This is warranted be-
cause, over the course of evolution, modifications in the design of
the universal human cognitive architecture were likely to be in-
corporated to the extent that they improved the functional opera-
tion of the architecture—that is, increased the rate that the archi-
tecture successfully solved adaptive information-processing
problems (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Sherry & Schacter,
1987). Chance and natural selection are the only two families of
process that drive evolutionary change, and together over evolu-
tionary time they constructed the human cognitive architecture.
Researchers who apply functionalist concepts or analyses to cog-
nitive problems should welcome the integration of modern evolu-
tionary biology into cognitive science because, outside of the
operation of natural selection on our ancestors, there is no logical
reason the brain should include any functionally organized ele-
ments beyond what random processes would produce.4 For this
reason, in this article we apply to the study of memory systems the
logic of adaptationism5—the principles for studying the functional
3 More fully, a search engine ought to be designed to deliver information as
a function of how its procedures predict its potential appropriateness, so that
information predicted to be most relevant should be accelerated in comparison
with information predicted to be less relevant. Moreover, information that
meets criteria for appropriateness, but that has features that predict that it might
disrupt decision making, is expected to be retarded or inhibited.
4 One of the benefits of injecting modern evolutionary biology into
psychology is a more stringent, rigorous set of criteria for understanding
the origins and nature of functional organization in biological systems such
as the brain. Biologists recognize that all functional organization is present
ultimately because of the prior operation of natural selection (see, e.g.,
Dawkins, 1982, 1986). Selection constructs proximate machinery whose
operation then may interact with the environment ontogenetically to con-
struct individual-specific organization, such as a skill, many of whose
details were not prespecified by selection. However, absent natural selec-
tion, there would be no well-engineered proximate machinery that responds
to environmental structure (or the organism’s goals) by orchestrating the
construction of the functional organization. For this reason, every time a
psychologist makes a functionalist argument, she is (knowingly or un-
knowingly) making an evolutionary argument. To improve the quality of
functionalist reasoning in psychology, it is better to recognize that func-
tionalism is evolutionary functionality, and to explicitly ground function-
alist arguments in the only body of knowledge that makes them legitimate.
5 Adaptationism refers to the evolutionary principles used to distinguish
functional organization from the by-products of function and from noise
introduced into designs by the stochastic components of evolution. The
rapid adaptationist advances in evolutionary biology that began in the
1960s were rooted in a widespread reaction against the practice of over-
attributing adaptation (Williams, 1966). Indeed, what defined the emer-
gence of modern adaptationism as a community and set of theories was its
anti-Panglossian empirical and theoretical practices, which have been
central to evolutionary biologists ever since. For example, in the book
Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolution-
ary Thought, Williams (1966) began his summary by saying, “Evolution-
ary adaptation is a special and onerous concept that should not be used
unnecessarily, and an effect should not be called a function unless it is
clearly produced by design and not by chance. When recognized, adapta-
tion should be attributed to no higher a level of organization than is
demanded by the evidence” (p. v). Some terminological confusion has
emerged for nonbiologists stemming from Gould and Lewontin’s idiosyn-
cratic use of the word adaptationism to mean Panglossian overattributions
of adaptation (see, e.g., Gould & Lewontin, 1979).
for the patterns in these observations. This distinction allows us to inves-
tigate hypotheses about the properties of these computational entities
without misleading readers into thinking that we are referring to the
observed phenomena instead. After all, a claim about a design feature of
one search engine (a computational entity) may not apply to all cases of
retrieval (an observed phenomenon): Different search engines may exist,
each with a different effect on retrieval. A decision rule is any system of
computational organization in the cognitive architecture that takes infor-
mation as input and produces behavioral decisions as output. A search
engine is any set of stable procedures in the cognitive architecture that
monitors the information requirements that an activated decision rule needs
to operate, searches memory, and delivers information from memory to the
activated decision rule. It may be that there is only one integrated search
engine, or there could be many search engines—one for each kind of
decision rule, for example. Making any more specific claims at this point
would be premature and unwarranted and would be unnecessary for de-
riving and testing the hypotheses in this article. Similarly, we are not
making any strong claims about whether the decision rules we are exper-
imentally activating, or the search engines that supply them with informa-
tion, are “innate” versus “acquired”—or more properly, reliably develop-
ing versus contingently developing. Our claim is merely that the
procedures that cause the reliable development or contingent acquisition of
decision rules and search engines are (a) evolved, (b) shaped by selection
so that they generate functional products, and (c) designed to produce
decision rule–search engine pairs that fit together to operate adaptively.
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design of naturally selected systems (Dawkins, 1986; Williams,
1966; for application to computational problems, see Cosmides &
Tooby, 1987, 1992, 1997; Marr, 1982). Although this way of
thinking is commonplace and is the root of many discoveries in
other fields such as physiology, medicine, and animal behavior
(e.g., Daly & Wilson, 1995; Gallistel, 1995; Mayr, 1983; Williams
& Nesse, 1991), it has not yet been widely applied in memory
research (with several notable exceptions, e.g., Nadel, 1994;
Sherry & Schacter, 1987; Tulving, 1995b). We think that func-
tional analysis may contribute significantly to the understanding of
the designs of memory systems and their relationships to other
aspects of the cognitive architecture, and that recent data on
multiple memory systems invites such an analysis. In this article,
we test hypotheses arising from only the most general functional
considerations of the interrelationships between decision rules,
search engines, and multiple memory systems, deferring the anal-
ysis of domain-specific effects on memory to the future.
Multiple Systems, Multiple Functions
When learning was believed to be a unitary process (either
associationistic or inferential, depending on the decade) with a
single function, a unitarian view of memory prevailed as well. The
same processes of encoding, storage, and retrieval were thought to
operate, whether the information represented was a fact about the
world, a skill, or a personal episode. Memory was a single system
with a single function: to store information for later use, no matter
what its content or kind (for reviews, see Foster & Jelicic, 1999;
Nadel, 1994; Polster, Nadel, & Schacter, 1991; Schacter, 1995;
Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Tulving, 1995a).
During the last two decades, however, unitarian views of both
learning and memory have been criticized on two grounds: (a)
They have trouble accounting for an expanding catalog of results
that document dissociations—both neural and functional—in how
information from different domains is acquired, represented, and
retrieved (for reviews, see Foster & Jelicic, 1999; Polster et al.,
1991; Nadel, 1994; Roediger & Craik, 1989; Schacter & Tulving,
1994; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; Squire, 1987); and (b) some
information-processing problems cannot be solved by a single
system of learning and/or memory because the computational
demands of one problem are incompatible with the computational
demands of the other (e.g., McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly,
1995; Nadel, 1994; Pinker, 1979, 1984; Sherry & Schacter, 1987;
Wexler & Culicover, 1980). In the study of memory, consider-
ations of this kind led a number of scientists to propose that the
human cognitive architecture contains up to five different, func-
tionally isolable memory systems: procedural, perceptual–repre-
sentational, primary (working memory), semantic, and episodic
(for reviews, see Markowitsch, 1995; Squire & Knowlton, 1995;
Tulving, 1995b; Tulving & Schacter, 1990; Weiskrantz, 1987).
Each system mediates the acquisition, representation, and retrieval
of a different kind of knowledge or skill, and at least four of them
are thought to be composed of several functionally specialized
subsystems.
Like all theories that question unitarian views, the proposal that
one brain contains multiple memory systems is somewhat contro-
versial. Nevertheless, studies from neuropsychology and experi-
mental psychology have produced enough evidence for several
neurally and functionally dissociable memory systems that this
hypothesis must be taken seriously (e.g., Campbell & Conway,
1995; Cohen, 1984; Foster & Jelicic, 1999; Hodges, Spatt, &
Patterson, 1999; R. Johnson, Kreiter, Zhu, & Russo, 1998; Knowl-
ton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996; Markowitsch et al., 1993; Marko-
witsch, Calabrese, Neufeld, Gehlen, & Durwen, 1999; McCarthy
& Warrington, 1990; McClelland et al., 1995; Perani et al., 1993;
Peretz, 1996; Reber, Knowlton, & Squire, 1996; Schacter & Tulv-
ing, 1994; Shallice, 1979; Squire, 1987, 1992; Tulving, 1983,
1985, 1987, 1993a; Tulving & Schacter, 1990; Van der Linden,
Bredart, Depoorter, & Coyette, 1996; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997;
Warrington, 1975; Weiskrantz, 1987, 1990).
If there are multiple memory systems—systems that are func-
tionally isolable—then it is important to ask why they exist.
Evolution does not produce new phenotypic systems that are
complex and functionally organized by chance. Such systems
acquire their functional organization because they solved some
evolutionarily recurrent problems for the organism. Understanding
the problems each memory system solves will help guide a more
systematic mapping of the design features of that memory system.
In short, memory research could benefit from developing more
nuanced, differentiated theories about the functions of memory.
This article is offered as a step in that direction.
The first step in applying adaptationist logic to the study of
memory is to think of memory as a component of a machine, the
second step is to distinguish a component’s capabilities from its
functions, the third is to identify the functions of the component
being investigated, and the fourth is to identify the causal relation-
ship between the functions of the component and its structure.
Principles of Organic Design
Function Versus Capability
For almost a century, psychologists have been exploring the
capabilities of human memory systems, which are staggering.
These systems can encode, store, and retrieve a vast array of
information, including much that is adaptively arbitrary and evo-
lutionarily novel, from nonsense syllables, jingles, and batting
averages to chess moves, equations, and the triple Lutz. However,
agnostically cataloging arbitrary samples out of the inexhaustible
set of everything a memory system is capable of doing is not likely
to lead to knowledge of its function.
A machine is a system designed to solve problems—that is, a
system whose parts exist in their present form because that ar-
rangement solves a problem. Memory is a component of a neural
machine designed to use information acquired in the past to
coordinate an organism’s behavior in the present.
To understand the design of organic machines (as well as
machines made by humans), one needs to make a sharp conceptual
distinction between a machine’s capabilities and its function. To
specify a machine’s function is to specify what it was designed to
do. A three-hole punch, for example, is designed to put holes in
writing paper so it can be stored in a three-ring binder. Knowing
this function allows one to understand why the three-hole punch’s
parts exist in their present form: why it has elements sharp enough
to cut paper, why the elements are cylindrical (to cut out holes for
the rings, not slits or lacy patterns), why their diameter is 1/4–1/2
in., why there are three of them, why they are spread out, why they
form a straight line, why one handpress lowers all three, and so on.
These elements are design features—aspects of the machine that
are there because they contribute to its function.
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Yet every machine, by virtue of having a particular causal
structure, is capable of doing an endless series of things that it was
not designed to do. As many children discover, if you shake a
well-used three-hole punch, confetti comes out. The production of
small circles of paper is a by-product of the machine’s design.
None of the parts named above exist because that arrangement
makes confetti (and, in fact, they are not particularly well designed
for doing so; a confetti maker should have many more punchers,
these should be as close together as possible so as not to waste
paper, they do not need to be cylindrical, etc.). Confetti making
does not explain the presence or arrangement of the punch’s parts.
Nor do any of the punch’s other capabilities—its usefulness for
weighting down paper or for whacking indolent graduate students,
for example. These capabilities are arbitrary with respect to its
intended function, mere by-products of the machine’s design.
The tradition of studying memory by seeing what it is capable of
doing—without asking what it was designed to do—is like study-
ing a three-hole punch as if it were a confetti maker or a paper-
weight. It is not an efficient method for homing in on the small set
of highly ordered, interlocking elements that embody the func-
tional design of a system. Indeed, some research principles may
actively prevent the discovery of such central elements. In gradu-
ate school, for example, we (the authors) were taught the Ebbing-
haus tradition: that in constructing memory experiments, one
should avoid using any stimuli that are emotionally charged or
drawn from adaptively important domains. But this prejudges the
issue. What if there are memory systems that are designed to store
information about one’s own children or about food locations or
about dangerous situations? Such systems have been found in
other species (for offspring, Beecher, 1990; Kendrick, Levy, &
Keverne, 1992; McCracken & Gustin, 1992; for food locations,
Hampton et al., 1995; for danger, Mineka & Cook, 1988). What if
functionally specialized, content-specific memory systems exist in
the human mind as well? (as indeed they do; see Jacobs & Nadel,
1985; Ohman, Dimberg, & Ost, 1985, Pittman & Orr, 1995; Sherry
& Schacter, 1987; Silverman & Eals, 1992). These cannot be
discovered if one’s experimental repertoire is limited to stimuli
chosen because they are functionally arbitrary, or if one’s pretheo-
retical commitments mandate that all a system’s capabilities are
co-equal. They are not. A system’s function provides a privileged
frame of reference: the only way of dividing a machine into parts
that explains why those parts exist and take the form that they do.
As a secondary matter, a functional description will, because it is
causal, allow one to derive what the system’s other, nonfunctional
capabilities are as well.
Decision Rules, Search Engines, and Memory
Recently, some memory researchers have been investigating the
relationship between the design of a given memory system and its
adaptive function. Scientists taking this approach have been find-
ing that many seemingly arbitrary design features of memory
systems can be understood by considering what problems they
were designed to solve (J. R. Anderson, 1989, 1991; J. R. Ander-
son & Milson, 1989; Babey, Queller, & Klein, 1998; Glenberg,
1997; Hampton et al., 1995; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Nadel, 1994;
Rozin, 1976; Sherry, 1997; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; Suddendorf
& Corballis, 1997; Tulving, 1995b). We argue that further progress
can be made by considering what problems the procedures that use
data from memory systems were designed to solve. After all,
whether an organism can profit from its past depends not only on
the design of its memory systems, but also on those aspects of the
cognitive architecture that interact with these systems: learning
mechanisms, inference systems, decision rules, and search en-
gines. Here, we focus on cognitive processes that use stored
information to make judgments and decisions. From a design point
of view, there is an intimate relationship between decision rules,
retrieval processes, and memory systems. For a decision rule that
uses stored information to work, it needs search engines: programs
designed to respond to the activation of a decision rule by search-
ing for and identifying information in the organism’s memory
systems that is potentially relevant to the decision being made, and
delivering what they find to the input buffer that feeds that deci-
sion rule.
However, the more information an organism encodes, the more
difficult it is to engineer a system that can deliver the right
information to the right decision rule at the right time while not
simultaneously flooding it with irrelevant information. What is
important is to engineer a match between the content of the stored
information and the mechanism that requires it (Nadel, 1994).
Decision rules need search engines that “surf the net” for appro-
priate content. Which content is appropriate depends on the adap-
tive problem that that decision rule was designed to solve: Mate
choice requires different information than food choice or predator
avoidance. Different decision rules will need different search en-
gines, and one would expect these search engines to be designed to
pull up data structures by their content. Whereas some tasks may
require content-specific information from episodic memory alone
or from semantic memory alone, other tasks may require content-
specific information from both of these memory systems. There-
fore, when it comes to retrieval, dissociations between memory
systems may not be absolute; as a matter of design, one might find
independence for some tasks and joint activation for others. This
suggests that, when it comes to retrieval, the extent to which one
finds functional independence between memory systems will re-
flect the informational requirements of the decision rule activated.
In this article, we concentrate on (some of) the functions of
episodic and semantic memory, and the decision rules that access
them. In doing so, we focus on research by Klein and colleagues
that explored the conditions under which episodic and semantic
memories are retrieved by decision rules that make trait judgments.
These experiments used a priming paradigm and a decision task
that requires retrieval of trait knowledge. The results showed that
retrieval from episodic and semantic memory is independent in
some decision contexts but not in others. They further showed that
whether retrieval is independent depends in lawful ways on the
content of the information being retrieved. The situations under
which independence breaks down suggest that priming of person
knowledge is not merely a by-product of spreading neural activa-
tion or some other incidental feature of the system’s design:
Rather, it is a functional component of a decision mechanism
designed to use information from one memory system to place
boundary conditions on information retrieved from the other (the
scope hypothesis).
Why Trait Judgment?
We believe that episodic and semantic memory systems evolved
to solve many different problems and that they are accessed by
many different kinds of decision rules. Nevertheless, in testing a
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theory, one must start with a single, specific problem domain. We
began with the problem of judging personality traits.
Trait judgment is a good place to begin for five reasons. First,
making trait judgments involves categorization and, as Jackendoff
(1987) put it, “The ability to categorize is what makes it possible
to use previous experience to guide the interpretation of new
experience, for without categorization, memory is virtually use-
less” (p. 135). If memory systems and the mechanisms that use
them have interlocking design features, then deciding whether a
trait category adequately describes a person is the kind of task in
which one should find these features.
Second, categorizing people—both oneself and others—as
“kind,” “cruel,” “friendly,” “aggressive,” and so on, is a pervasive
aspect of human life. People automatically condense the rich
complexity of human actions into a limited number of personality
dimensions that have predictive validity (Funder, 1995; Funder &
Sneed, 1993; Kolar, Funder, & Colvin, 1996) and use these judg-
ments in deciding how to interact with others. These judgments are
highly accurate, even when they are made quickly and on the basis
of very limited information (Funder & Sneed, 1993). Moreover,
one’s competence in this regard develops in the absence of explicit
instruction (much as learning a first language does), despite the
inherent complexity of the task (consider what it would take to
create a computer program that could infer motivations and inten-
tions from actions and use these inferences to make trait judg-
ments). Taken together, these facts—ubiquity, complexity, speed,
accuracy, automaticity, and competence without tuition—suggest
that the human cognitive architecture may have evolved compu-
tational machinery specialized for performing personality trait
judgments.
Third, evidence from primatology, paleoanthropology, and stud-
ies of modern hunter-gatherers converge on a picture of human
hunter-gatherer ancestors as long-lived, highly social, and living in
relatively stable social groups: conditions that would favor the
evolution of machinery that is good at extracting accurate person-
ality information and using it to predict behavior. Primate studies
suggest this ability is phylogenetically ancient: Chimpanzees and
bonobos also adjust their social behavior in ways that reflect the
personalities of different interactants (de Waal, 1982; de Waal &
Lanting, 1997). The hominid and great ape lines are thought to
have diverged 5–10 million years ago, so there has been a very
long period of time during which selection could have specialized
and improved the mechanisms that generate these judgments.
Given this time depth and the positive fitness consequences that
would accrue from any design alteration that improves its bearer’s
ability to predict behavior, one would expect the decision rules that
make trait judgments, as well as the memorial databases that store
the information used by these decision rules, to have been targets
of selection. Indeed, we suspect that some of the most important
functions of episodic memory have to do with social interaction,
which depends (in part) on judging traits.
Fourth, there is a large literature on the use of memory in trait
judgment, including many neuropsychological studies showing
dissociations in retrieval of episodic and semantic trait knowledge
(e.g., Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1989; Klein, Loftus, & Kihl-
strom, 1996; Tranel & Damasio, 1993; Tulving, 1993a). In hu-
mans, the decision rules that make trait judgments are known to
access both the episodic and the semantic memory systems (see
below). Priming paradigms allow one to sensitively probe the
circumstances under which this occurs, and a good model system
describing these circumstances in some detail has already been
developed by Klein and Loftus (1993b). This makes trait judgment
a good domain for examining how decision rules interact with
episodic and semantic memory systems and for testing hypotheses
about the conditions under which independence will, and will not,
be found.
Fifth and last, the computational problems that arise in trait
judgment are an instance of a broader category of problems in-
volving the adaptive functions of what we call inceptive and
derived memories. Inceptive memories are representations of the
world stored in the way they were encoded at their inception (the
time at which they were first experienced). Many of the episodic
memories retrieved during trait judgment appear to be inceptive. A
derived memory is a higher level representation that was derived
from inceptive memory stores but was computationally trans-
formed to supply information in a form that minimizes the need for
further processing by the decision rules that use it. Semantic
memory includes many databases of derived memories, such as the
trait summaries that are retrieved by the decision rules that judge
whether a person is friendly, cruel, or kind. We argue that incep-
tive and derived memories exist because both are useful, but for
different purposes.
Because a great deal is already known about how inceptive and
derived memories interact in trait judgment, this domain provides
a concrete point of entry for considering what we believe to be a
more general class of information-management problems involv-
ing trade-offs between speed and accuracy. According to the scope
hypothesis, an excellent package of speed plus accuracy can be
engineered into a decision system by jointly activating a derived
memory and the inceptive memories that contradict it. Therefore,
although we tested the scope hypothesis in the domain of trait
judgment, we believe it applies more generally and close this
article with a review of evidence suggesting that this design feature
is found in decision rules in a number of different domains.
Judging Oneself
There is a particularly rich literature on how people judge their
own traits (for review, see Babey et al., 1998; Bem, 1972; Hamp-
son, 1982; Kihlstrom et al., 1988; Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994; Klein
& Loftus, 1993b; Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979; Wyer &
Gordon, 1984). If one wishes to investigate cognitive processes
that access episodic and semantic memory, this is a propitious
area. Most theories of trait judgment assume that the individual has
(or had) a database of experiences from which trait judgments can
be made. Every potential subject has a large database of experi-
ences about themselves, which includes knowledge of their own
reactions to a wide variety of social situations. For this reason, one
can test hypotheses without worrying that the subject merely lacks
memories relevant to the topic.
We examine below the relation among episodic memory, se-
mantic memory, and a particular type of categorization/decision
process—judgments of one’s own traits (e.g., Kihlstrom & Klein,
1994, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993a, 1993b; Klein, Babey, &
Sherman, 1997; Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989; Klein, Loftus, &
Kihlstrom, 1996; Klein, Loftus, & Plog, 1992; Klein, Loftus,
Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Klein, Sherman, & Loftus, 1996; Lord,
1993; Schell, Klein, & Babey, 1996). For example, when someone
asks, “Are you kind?” do categorization algorithms consult a
library of personal memories, computing answers on the fly from
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whatever episodes happen to be activated by the situation at hand?
Or have many of the answers to this class of questions been
previously computed and stored as a database of abstract summary
traits? That is, does a “look-up” procedure activate a representation
in summary form—an entry under the heading “self” in an ency-
clopedic semantic memory? Or do both go on in parallel? If a
summary representation is activated, are related episodes from an
autobiographical memory system activated in its wake? If so, what
kind of episodes does it entrain, supporting evidence or counter-
examples? For example, when you are asked, “Are you kind?”
does this prime recall of episodes that represent specific incidents
in which you were kind—or unkind?
We first review findings from studies of both normal and
clinical populations that converge on the conclusion that semantic
knowledge of our own traits and the episodic memories that bear
on it are typically stored and retrieved independently of one
another. We then describe circumstances in which one might
expect this independence to break down, and report experiments
showing that it does.
Episodic and Semantic Personal Memory
Each of the five memory systems so far proposed is thought to
mediate the acquisition, representation, and retrieval of a different
kind of knowledge or skill. By hypothesis, the procedural system
mediates conditioning and the acquisition of skills, the perceptual-
representational system supports the identification of objects based
only on modality-specific information about their form and struc-
ture, primary (working, short-term) memory is a buffer that makes
information temporarily accessible to mechanisms that cause lan-
guage comprehension and certain forms of inference, the semantic
memory system contains general knowledge about the world, and
the episodic memory system creates a personal past (e.g., Marko-
witsch, 1995; Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Tulving, 1983, 1995b;
Tulving & Schacter, 1990; Weiskrantz, 1987).
Episodic memory records events as having been experienced by
the self within a subjective space–time matrix; when retrieved,
these events are reexperienced in a quasi-perceptual way, with
conscious awareness that “this happened to me” (e.g., Tulving,
1972, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1993b). Episodic recollection thus has a
self-referential quality, which was thought to be missing from
other types of memorial experiences (e.g., procedural, perceptual,
semantic; e.g., Tulving, 1984, 1987). Over the last few years,
however, evidence from clinical neuropsychology has raised the
possibility that other types of memory experiences might be self-
referential as well. For example, Klein, Loftus, and Kihlstrom
(1996) report the case of W.J., who suffered a concussive blow to
the head shortly after completing her first quarter in college. As a
result of her injury, W.J. showed profound amnesia for personal
events and experiences over the 6 months immediately prior to her
accident. However, despite her dense retrograde amnesia, W.J.’s
memory for general facts about her life during that period seemed
largely intact. For example, she knew which classes she had
attended, although she could not recall a specific occasion when
she attended class or a specific event that happened during a class;
she knew the names of teachers and friends from college, but could
not remember particular experiences shared with them.
A similar dissociation between event and factual self-knowledge
is seen in the case of patient K.C. (e.g., Tulving, 1989; Tulving,
Schacter, McLachlan, & Moscovitch, 1988). K.C., as a result of a
severe head injury, was no longer able to consciously bring to
mind a single personal experience from any point in his life.
Despite his total loss of episodic personal memory, K.C. still knew
a variety of facts about himself. He knew, for example, that his
family owned a summer house and where it was located, but he
could not recall a single occasion when he was at the house, nor
could he recall a single event that occurred there (for related
findings, see Cermak & O’Connor, 1983; Evans, Breen, Antoun, &
Hodges, 1996; Evans, Wilson, Wraight, & Hodges, 1993; Klein,
Chan, & Loftus, 1999; Klein, Cosmides, Costablie, & Mei, in
press; Klein, Rozendal, & Cosmides, in press).
To explain these dissociations between event and factual self-
knowledge, Tulving has suggested broadening the concept of
self-referential memory to include a semantic as well as an epi-
sodic component (e.g., Tulving, 1989, 1993a; Tulving et al., 1988;
see also Brewer, 1986; Cermak & O’Connor, 1983; Conway,
1992; Craik et al., 1999; Kihlstrom et al., 1988; Kihlstrom &
Klein, 1994, 1997; Klein, 1999; Klein, Sherman, & Loftus, 1996;
Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989). Semantic personal mem-
ory enables people to retrieve general facts about their personal
past. It is self-knowledge in summary form. Although these sum-
mary representations are about the self and have been abstracted
from memories of the self in a set of events, they do not preserve
a record of the events from which they were derived. The fact that
the patients reported by Klein, Loftus, and Kihlstrom (1996) and
Tulving (1989, 1993a) had access to semantic personal knowledge
but not the particular episodes on which this knowledge was based
can be interpreted as evidence in support of a separation between
these two types of self-referential memories.
The Evidence for Independence
Not only can one have semantic knowledge about the circum-
stances of one’s life, but one can also have semantic knowledge
about one’s own personality traits (for reviews, see Kihlstrom &
Klein, 1994; Klein, 2001; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1998; Klein &
Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996). Klein and
Loftus and their colleagues recently proposed and tested a model
of the relation between memories of personal experiences and trait
conceptions of self (e.g., Klein et al., 1989, 1997, 1999; Klein &
Loftus, 1990, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c; Klein, Loftus, & Plog, 1992;
Klein, Loftus, & Sherman, 1993; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhr-
man, 1992; Klein, Sherman, & Loftus, 1996; Kihlstrom & Klein,
1994, 1997; Schell et al., 1996). Their model incorporated the
following three features. First, long-term knowledge of one’s traits
is abstracted from multiple experiences with trait-relevant behav-
iors and represented in semantic memory in summary form. Sec-
ond, trait judgments about the self are made by accessing these
summary representations without reference to the behavioral epi-
sodes from which they were derived. And third, summary trait
representations are functionally independent of memories of trait-
relevant behavioral episodes.
There now is ample evidence that people form summary repre-
sentations of their own personality traits and retrieve these when
asked to decide whether a particular trait describes them (e.g.,
Craik et al., 1999; Hirshman & Lanning, 1999; Kircher et al.,
2000; Klein et al., 1989, 1993, 1997, 1999; Klein & Loftus, 1990,
1993a, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996; Klein, Loftus, &
Plog, 1992; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Lord, 1993;
Schell et al., 1996). Equally important, a large body of evidence
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shows that people maintain detailed stores of behavioral episodes
they have experienced (e.g., Barclay, 1996; Conway & Bekerian,
1987; Klein et al., 1989, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein,
Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Nelson, 1993b, 1996; Rubin,
1986; Singer & Salovey, 1993; Strauman, 1990).
Klein and Loftus have provided evidence that episodic and
semantic trait self-knowledge is independently represented and
used. For example, using a priming paradigm, they examined
whether behavioral memories are activated when one decides
whether a trait describes oneself (describe task). If they are acti-
vated, then one should be able to retrieve those memories faster
after performing a describe task than after performing a control
task. This was not the case: When subjects were asked to recall a
specific behavioral incident in which they manifested a particular
trait (recall task), those who had first made a self-descriptiveness
judgment were no faster than those who had not (e.g., Klein et al.,
1989; Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, &
Fuhrman, 1992). Yet the procedure that was used is known to be
sensitive enough to detect episodic priming when it occurs (e.g.,
Babey et al., 1998; Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton,
& Fuhrman, 1992; Sherman, 1996; Sherman & Klein, 1994; Sher-
man, Klein, Laskey, & Wyer, 1998). Klein and Loftus concluded
from this that the semantic personal knowledge required for a
self-descriptiveness judgment was accessed without activating
memories of episodes in which that person’s behavior exemplified
the trait.
Subsequent experiments that eliminated alternative interpreta-
tions of these results provided even clearer evidence that trait
self-descriptiveness judgments can be made without reference to
behavioral evidence (e.g., Klein et al., 1997; Klein & Loftus,
1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992). It has been
suggested, for example, that some traits are more central to one’s
self-concept than others and that noncentral traits are less likely to
be represented in summary form. If so, it may be necessary to
activate and evaluate specific behavioral memories to decide
whether a noncentral trait is self-descriptive, even though such
“evidence” is unnecessary when the trait in question is central
(e.g., Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Kihl-
strom et al., 1988). In this scenario, behavioral memories would be
primed when people judge the self-descriptiveness of noncentral
traits, but not central ones. If such a difference exists, it would
not have been apparent in the data reported above because
those studies combined all traits without regard to level of
self-descriptiveness.
To address this concern, Klein, Loftus, Trafton, and Fuhrman
(1992) repeated the Klein and Loftus priming procedure and
afterward had subjects rate each trait for self-descriptiveness.
These ratings were used to sort subjects’ response latencies into
three levels of trait self-descriptiveness (high, medium, and low).
Regardless of the self-descriptiveness of the trait being judged, no
priming was observed between the describe and recall tasks (see
also Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994; Klein et al., 1997; Klein & Loftus,
1990, 1993b). Klein and Loftus interpreted this result as indicating
that there are few, if any, trait dimensions for which people have
not had sufficient experience to form summary trait self-knowl-
edge: When it comes to our own personalities, we are all “experts.”
Results from studies using other methods also support the in-
dependence of episodic and semantic trait knowledge about the
self. Klein, Loftus, and Plog (1992), for example, made use of the
phenomenon of transfer-appropriate processing (e.g., Roediger &
Blaxton, 1987; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989) in a study of
recognition memory for traits to show that different processes are
involved in accessing the two types of knowledge. Klein et al.
(1989, Experiment 4) applied the principle of encoding variability
(e.g., Bower, 1972; Martin, 1971) in a study of recall for traits and
found that the type of information made available when making
trait judgments was different from that made available when
retrieving trait-relevant behaviors.
Additional support for the independence of episodic and seman-
tic trait self-knowledge recently was presented by Craik et al.
(1999). Using positron emission tomography, these investigators
discovered that requiring participants to judge trait adjectives for
self-descriptiveness produced activation of cortical areas associ-
ated with semantic memory retrieval (left frontal regions) but not
those associated with episodic memory retrieval (right frontal
regions). Similar findings using functional magnetic resonance
imaging have recently been reported by Kircher et al. (2000).
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence for the independent storage
and retrieval of episodic and semantic trait self-knowledge comes
from studies of patients with disorders of memory (e.g., Klein,
2001; Klein et al., 1999; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1998; Klein, Loftus,
& Kihlstrom, 1996; Klein, Rozendal, & Cosmides, in press; Re-
invang & Gjerstad, 1998; Schacter, Wang, Tulving, & Freedman,
1982; Tulving, 1993a). For example, Tulving (1993a), testing a
speculation by Klein and Loftus (1993b), found that patient K.C.,
who permanently lost his entire fund of episodic memory following a
motorcycle accident (and underwent a marked personality change),
was able to describe his postmorbid personality with considerable
accuracy (his mother’s ratings served as the criterion). Thus, K.C.
was able to acquire semantic knowledge of his new personality
without being able to recall information about any of the behav-
ioral episodes through which that knowledge was gained.
More recently, Klein, Loftus, and Kihlstrom (1996) presented
the case of patient W.J., who, as a result of a severe head injury,
suffered a temporary loss of episodic memory. W.J. was asked
both during her amnesia and following its resolution to make trait
judgments about herself. Because her responses when she could
access behavioral episodes were consistent with her responses
when she could not, Klein, Loftus, and Kihlstrom concluded that
the loss of trait-relevant episodic memories did not greatly affect
the availability of her semantic trait self-knowledge. Results such
as these offer strong support for the general proposition that summary
knowledge of one’s traits is represented and accessed separately
from memory of one’s trait-relevant behaviors (for related find-
ings, see Klein, Cosmides, et al., in press; Klein et al., 1999).
Why Have Both Inceptive and Derived Memories?
To decide whether a trait describes them, Klein and Loftus’s
(nonamnesic) subjects retrieved a trait summary. It is important to
note, however, that subjects could have decided this question by
consulting a library of relevant behavioral episodes; after all, they
were able to recall specific episodes in which they manifested
the trait at issue. Both types of representation—semantic and
episodic—were present. It’s just that retrieving a semantic trait
summary did not cause subjects to recall episodes faster than
otherwise.
But why form trait summaries if one can consult a library of
episodes? Conversely, why retain episodes after having abstracted
a summary representation from them? Are there functional reasons
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to have trait information represented in two different, indepen-
dently retrievable databases? More generally, are there functional
reasons to have databases of both inceptive and derived memories?
Trade-Offs: Memory Versus Computation,
Speed Versus Accuracy
Advantageous scheduling of slow computation. Social interac-
tion often requires split-second decisions, some of which are best
made by taking into account a diverse array of information. How-
ever, it takes time to search for, retrieve, reformat, and integrate
the disparate (and sometimes incommensurable) information
needed to make certain decisions. For example, behavioral epi-
sodes are concrete interactions, each involving different actors and
circumstances. They do not come with signs labeling the behavior
of an individual actor as “kind,” “honest,” or “cruel”; To make
such judgments, one needs to make inferences about the motiva-
tions and opportunities of the actors in each episode one has
experienced or heard about, and then somehow combine these
determinations into a summary judgment. All else being equal,
better decisions will be made if this analysis is complete before a
decision requiring it is imminent. Performing some (or all) of the
necessary computation in advance can, therefore, be advantageous.
Inceptive versus derived memories. It is useful to distinguish
inceptive memories from derived memories. Inceptive memories
are representations of the world stored more or less in the way they
were encoded at their inception (the time at which they were first
experienced). Many episodic memories appear to be inceptive:
They often contain perceptual detail, proprioceptive information,
emotion qualia, a sense of the self as present in the encoding
situation, and the sense that the memory is very similar to the
original experience. But not all inceptive memories are episodic. It
is logically possible to have an inceptive memory about a specific
event involving the self without its being episodic in character—it
would not be episodic if it lacked the subjective sense of self in
space and time that is diagnostic of episodic memory.
Derived memories are so called because they were derived from
inceptive memory stores but were computationally transformed to
supply information in a form that minimizes the need for further
processing by the decision rules that use it. A derived memory
system—together with its inferential machinery—prepares an-
swers or preprocesses information into usable and ready forms, to
facilitate decisions and judgments of a specific type that would
otherwise be detrimentally retarded if they had to be computed
from raw data on demand.
The computational operations that generate derived memory are
not limited to mere extraction of information from inceptive mem-
ory. They may augment it as well. A derived memory can contain
information not present in any of the inceptive memories on which
it was based, generated by procedures that made inferences from
the inceptive data. A derived memory may, in some cases, be the
output of the same decision process that uses it at a later time: If
one needs to decide at Time 1, on the basis of behavioral episodes,
whether Person Y is honest, the conclusion might be stored as a
derived memory for use at Time 2. A trait summary is a form of
derived memory; a stored episode is an inceptive memory.
Because of their advantages, human memory may be full of
independent, derived memory stores linked to various inceptive
memory stores (see also Nadel, 1994). The linked memory stores
of abstracted personality traits and behavioral episodes that exem-
plify those traits may prove to be an interesting model system that
can illuminate properties that are common to many memory stores.
Memory versus computation. The adaptive function of infor-
mation storage is intrinsically prospective: It is used to support
future decisions and judgments, which cannot be known in ad-
vance with certainty. To the extent that the character of subsequent
decisions and judgments can be predicted, the memory system can
be tailored to flag relevant information and precompute variables
that are required to make them—that is, it can develop a derived
memory store.
However useful it would be to have the answers to all questions
that might be asked precomputed and immediately on tap in a
derived memory system, this set is indefinitely large and hence
precluded by limitations on computational and memory resources.
In functional terms, factors that should govern the number and type
of derived memory stores include (a) predictability: the existence
of factors, either ontogenetic or phylogenetic, that allow the suc-
cessful anticipation of likely varieties of future judgment or deci-
sion types; (b) importance: the value of those judgments or deci-
sions ought to justify the costs; (c) urgency: the requirement that
such judgments be made quickly; and (d) economy: the number of
judgments or decisions supported by a derived memory store
should be proportionately large with respect to its size. The use of
trait summaries in making decisions about social interactions
meets all four criteria.
Storing semantic summaries has both advantages and draw-
backs. Direct retrieval of precomputed representations (derived
memory) economizes on on-line computation and is fast. But it
takes up increasing amounts of memory the larger the set of
representations that must be precomputed and on tap, and may
provide information that is no longer up to date. In contrast,
procedures triggered on line that take inceptive memories as input
economize on (derived) memory and provide up-to-date informa-
tion. But they are expensive computationally and increasingly
slow, the more computational steps that are involved. An archi-
tecture designed functionally would be shaped by these trade-offs,
using different mixes of memory versus computation for different
types of adaptive problem (e.g., Pinker, 1997, 1999). Decisions
about personality traits provide a case in point.
When Are Trait Summaries Formed?
The evidence on when and how trait summaries are formed, and
when they are consulted, is broadly consistent with the functional
considerations discussed above. Dynamically, when the data set of
relevant events is small, judgments about personality traits appear
to be made predominantly on the basis of retrieved behavioral
episodes (e.g., Klein et al., 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993a,
1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Sherman &
Klein, 1994; but see Klein, Sherman, & Loftus, 1996, for an
important qualification). As the behavioral evidence grows, judg-
ments are increasingly made by accessing an emerging trait sum-
mary and decreasingly by accessing relevant episodes. When the
amount of experience is high, the semantic summary is well
developed, and trait judgments are made by accessing this knowl-
edge (e.g., Klein et al., 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993a, 1993b;
Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Schell et al., 1996). This
process is faster than retrieving and considering individual in-
stances (e.g., Klein et al., 1989, 1997; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, &
Fuhrman, 1992; Sherman & Klein, 1994), and it bypasses and
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inhibits this other judgment route (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1993b,
1993c; Klein, Sherman, & Loftus, 1996; Sherman & Klein, 1994).
Evidence suggests that semantic trait summaries are constructed
on the basis of the same set of behavioral episodes that are input
into the episodic store (e.g., Babey et al., 1998; Sherman, 1996;
Sherman & Klein, 1994), although supplementation from other
sources of information has not been ruled out (e.g., Klein, Loftus,
Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Lord, 1993; Nelson, 1993a). It is not
yet clear whether the two stores are constructed in parallel (with
summaries updated as new episodes occur) or whether the seman-
tic store is derived from the episodic store after the accumulation
of a number of episodes. In any event, neurally impaired individ-
uals who exhibit an inability to retrieve individual events (i.e.,
access episodic memory) show no apparent impairment in their
ability to make accurate trait judgments (e.g., Damasio, Tranel, &
Damasio, 1989; M. K. Johnson, Kim, & Risse, 1985; Klein et al.,
1999; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996; Klein, Rozendal, &
Cosmides, in press; Schacter et al., 1982; Tranel & Damasio,
1993) and even maintain the ability to revise their trait judgments
based on new episodes they cannot recall (e.g., Tulving, 1993a).
This suggests that conscious retrieval of behavioral episodes is
unnecessary for trait judgments to be made. It further suggests the
following: Either updating of semantic information occurs as each
episode is experienced (and not later, on the basis of stored
episodes) or else the procedures involved in updating do not
require conscious access to the episodic store (e.g., Sherman &
Klein, 1994; Tulving, 1993a; see also Medin & Bettger, 1994;
Riskey, 1979).
Why Store Episodes After a Trait Summary Has
Been Formed?
Given the benefits of having a trait summary—speedy access to
information, avoiding redundant and costly computation—why
have anything else? Once a trait summary is formed—“Tom is
rarely cruel,” “I am usually calm”—why not save on memory
resources by losing (or overwriting) the episodes on which it was
based?
A summary lacks information present in the episodes from
which it was derived. Retrieving a trait summary may be faster
than constructing a judgment on line from a database of episodes,
but it is necessarily less accurate. Maintaining a database of
inceptive, episodic memories solves several problems that a trait
summary cannot.
Reevaluating Conclusions
New information may cause previous episodes to be reinter-
preted, drastically changing one’s judgments of a person or a
situation. Fred’s friendly willingness to help you with household
repairs may take on different significance if you learn that he is
attracted to your wife; Leslie’s willingness to lend you money last
year may be reinterpreted when you learn that she had a large and
undisclosed financial interest in doing so. If episodes were lost
after they had been analyzed to form a summary judgment of
Fred’s character, reevaluating his past actions in light of new
information about his intentions and values would be impossible.
Keeping a database of episodes is helpful even when a drastic
reinterpretation of previous events is not called for. Judgments can
be revised in light of new information: If a judgment that “Fred is
usually friendly” was based on 30 episodes, an unfriendly act by
Fred should have less impact on the judgment than if it had been
based on three episodes (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; see also Babey
et al., 1998; Sherman & Klein, 1994). Without the original data-
base, it is difficult to know whether new, inconsistent information
should change one’s summary judgment and, if so, by how much.
Moreover, new reference classes can be formed to answer new
questions. Suppose you need to decide whether your best friend
would make a good employee—something you never considered
before. If a database of richly encoded episodes exists, it can be
sifted for events relevant to making such a judgment (for discus-
sion, see Cosmides & Tooby, 2000).
Assessing Credal Value
Maintaining source information allows one to evaluate the cre-
dal value of people’s statements. Let’s say that Rhonda, who
immediately befriended you when you started your new job, told
you many terrible things about another coworker, Adam. Much
later you find out that she has been stalking him ever since he
broke up with her a year ago. As a result, you realize that any
unflattering stories you heard from Rhonda may be untrue. In
forming an impression of Adam, you integrated information from
many sources. One of these sources turned out to be unreliable.
How can you update your judgments about Adam? Which of your
trait summaries for Adam are still reliable and which are not?
A database of episodic memories would allow you to reevaluate
your judgments about Adam. Your “Adam database” would in-
clude episodes in which you had interacted with Adam yourself,
episodes in which other people told you things about Adam, and
episodes in which Rhonda told you Adam stories. A database that
preserves these episodes allows you to consider the source: to sort
through the database and decide which judgments were based on
sound information and which were colored by Rhonda’s lies. Had
the episodes on which your judgments of Adam’s character were
based been lost, there would be no way to repair the corrupted
segments of your semantic store. The ability to judge and reeval-
uate the credal value of other people’s communications is essential
in an organism with language (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000).
Bounding the Scope of Generalizations
An independent store of episodes allows the scope of a summary
judgment—the circumstances under which it does, and does not,
apply—to be specified. A trait summary such as “He is rarely
honest” or “I am usually friendly” gives information about behav-
ior under “average” circumstances, but it does not tell you under
what circumstances the person’s behavior deviates from average.
In deciding how to behave, one is always facing a particular
situation. Let’s say your semantic memory has an entry on Demi:
“Demi is usually calm.” You are planning what you hope will be
a relaxed dinner party with some friends who are political activists
of a different stripe than Demi. Access to appropriate episodic
memories can delimit the scope of your semantic summary. Re-
calling that “Demi is usually calm—except those times we talked
about abortion” may alter your decision about whom to invite.
(Indeed, if there is a pattern to the exceptions, a summary of the
exceptions might eventually be made as well and stored as an
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if–then proposition about the conditions under which Demi can be
expected to become tense; Wright & Mischel, 1988.)6
Episodic Memories As Boundary Conditions on the Scope
of Generalizations
This last function leads to a counterintuitive prediction about the
relation between semantic and episodic memory when people are
called on to make trait judgments. When asked, “Does this de-
scribe you: friendly?” the decision rule activated should retrieve
two kinds of representations: a trait summary from semantic mem-
ory and episodes that are inconsistent with the trait one was asked
about. For example, “Are you a calm person?” might activate a
decision rule that retrieves, “Usually calm (except: the day my
tenure was being decided).”
Some traits are invariant over situations: Unless you are Alice in
Wonderland, the question, “Does this describe you: 5 ft 9 in. tall?”
will have a determinate answer. But personality does not exhibit
unwavering cross-situational consistency (e.g., Brody, 1988;
Hampson, 1982; Mischel, 1968), and the human cognitive system
implicitly recognizes this: People conceptualize personality as
conditionally dependent on situations (e.g., Wright & Mischel,
1988).
To rely on semantic memory alone is to sacrifice accuracy for
speed: Trait summaries lack the resolution of an episodic memory.
Although trait judgments do have some predictive validity, the
behavior of an individual manifests a great deal of situation spec-
ificity (e.g., Brody, 1988; Funder, 1995; Mischel, 1968). And
episodic memories are situation specificity incarnate: They are
records of how particular people behaved in specific situations. A
system engineered to retrieve, along with a generalization, epi-
sodes that place boundary conditions on its scope would achieve
the best of both worlds: speed courtesy of semantic memory,
accuracy courtesy of episodic memory.
The decision context should determine when boundary condi-
tions are needed and which kinds of episodes would be relevant.
Because decisions regarding personality traits are not amenable to
all-or-none answers (if they are to be made accurately), it would be
reasonable to assume that the trait summary takes a quasi-
quantitative form. Thus, when asked, “Does this describe you:
friendly?” possible answers might be “usually,” “sometimes,” or
“rarely.” Boundary conditions would be episodes in which you
were not friendly. This should be true for any level your friendly
summary specifies—even “rarely.” This is because the decision
context calls for a generalization about friendliness; the function of
activating episodes is to place boundary conditions on that gener-
alization. The issue is, “How often is Person Y friendly, and under
what conditions is she or he not?” The decision rule activated is
designed to make a judgment about the trait being asked about,
whether the question originates with another person or with the
individual making the judgment.
In our view, the issue is not, “How are personality traits repre-
sented in memory?” because this way of putting the question
assumes that the form in which traits are represented is invariant
over different decision contexts. We are arguing, instead, that
different decision rules are designed to retrieve different kinds of
information from memory. The type of decision being made mat-
ters, because that determines which search engine gets activated,
which will determine which array of memory systems gets
searched. When asked to trait-categorize their own behavior, sub-
jects should retrieve a trait summary and episodes inconsistent
with the trait they are being asked about. But these representations
may be irrelevant in other decision contexts. For example, being
asked to define friendly does not require a judgment about how
often any particular person is friendly. Because no judgment about
anyone’s typical behavior needs to be retrieved, there is no need to
bound its scope with trait-inconsistent episodes. Therefore, even
though defining friendly activates representations that share se-
mantic elements with personal trait summaries and personal epi-
sodes, one would not expect this decision context to prime either.
In a nutshell, our argument is this:
Every normal adult has a great deal of information about his or her
own behavior. We are all “experts” on ourselves and are likely to have
formed summary representations for most important traits, which can
be retrieved quickly when needed for decision making.
In real life (that is, outside of a psychology laboratory), the question,
“Does Trait X describe Person Y?” (where Person Y can be oneself or
someone else) is raised when one is considering how best to achieve
some outcome, and where the choice of plans depends, in part, on the
probability that Person Y will manifest Trait X in Situation Z.
Situations can be categorized in many different ways. A trait summary
derived from a large database of episodes (involving many different
situations) specifies how frequently Person Y has manifested Trait X
across situations. It therefore provides a good default, first-pass an-
swer—one made without prejudging which dimensions of Situation Z
might be relevant.
To form a successful plan, one needs to know the scope of this
generalization—its boundary conditions. Episodes in which Person Y
did not manifest Trait X can provide these boundary conditions. The
situations in which Person Y manifested trait-inconsistent behaviors
can be compared for similarities with the scenario under consider-
ation—that is, Situation Z.
An “expert” does not need to retrieve supporting evidence for his or
her generalizations. The goal is to retrieve accurate information
quickly. If one already has a trait summary for Person Y, retrieving
episodes in which Person Y manifested Trait X would be redundant,
and using them in the decision-making process would delay the
decision.
For these reasons, when one is asked to make a categorization judg-
ment about personality traits, the decision rule’s search engine should
retrieve the trait summary and trait-inconsistent episodes. It should not
retrieve trait-consistent episodes. Trait-consistent episodes are rele-
vant only when one has not yet formed a trait summary for Person Y.
We call this set of propositions the scope hypothesis.
In the experiments discussed below, we used the same priming
method as in the previously described experiments by Klein,
Loftus, and colleagues. On the basis of the scope hypothesis, we
predicted that retrieving a trait summary to answer a describe
question would prime trait-inconsistent episodes, but not trait-
consistent ones. The first experiment probed knowledge about
one’s own traits, because it is fairly certain that the typical adult
already has formed a database of trait summaries about himself or
herself. The second experiment probed knowledge about another
person’s traits—the subject’s mother—to see whether the same
results pertain when trait summaries are lacking.
6 Implicit in this list of functions is also a set of predictions about which
episodes ought to be differentially retained and which might be safely
discarded.
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Experimental Tests of the Scope Hypothesis
The Self Study
In our first study, we examined whether accessing a trait sum-
mary about the self would prime trait-inconsistent episodes but not
trait-consistent ones (Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2001).
We used a variant of Klein and Loftus’s priming technique (e.g.,
Klein et al., 1989; Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton,
& Fuhrman, 1992). Subjects were presented with a list of trait
adjectives and asked to perform one of three tasks with them. The
describe task asked subjects to decide whether the stimulus trait
describes them; the recall task asked subjects to retrieve a specific
instance in which they manifested the stimulus trait; the define task
asked subjects to generate a definition for the stimulus trait. Each
trial consisted of performing two of these tasks—an initial task and
a target task—in succession on either the same trait word or on a
trait and its antonym (e.g., rude and polite).
After subjects completed the experimental trials, they again
were presented with the trait words appearing in the initial task and
asked to indicate on a 9-point scale the extent to which each trait
described themselves. These ratings were used to sort subjects’
response latencies into three levels of trait self-descriptiveness
(high, medium, and low; for details on the sorting procedure, see
Klein & Loftus, 1990; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992).
If the scope hypothesis is correct, then deciding whether a trait
is self-descriptive will activate a summary representation and
episodes inconsistent with the trait being asked about. Empirically,
then, one should observe two things.
First, for trials on which the initial and target task trait words are
antonyms, an initial describe task should be more facilitating than
an initial define task to the subsequent performance of a recall task.
This is because deciding whether a trait describes oneself activates
a trait summary, whereas defining a trait does not (for evidence,
see Klein et al., 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a, 1993b; Klein,
Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992). When a trait summary is
activated, trait-inconsistent behavioral memories—which are re-
quired for performance of the subsequent recall task—should be
activated as well. Recall should be faster after a describe task, then,
because memories can be retrieved faster if they were recently
activated (e.g., Collins & Quillian, 1970; Klein et al., 1989; Klein
& Loftus, 1990, 1993b, 1993c; Malt, 1989).
Second, for trials on which the initial and target task trait words
are the same, an initial describe task should be no more facilitating
than an initial define task to the subsequent performance of a recall
task. This is because trait-consistent episodes are not activated by
retrieval of a trait summary and thus are not activated by a describe
judgment (e.g., Babey, Queller, & Klein, 1998; Kihlstrom & Klein,
1994; Klein et al., 1989, 1993, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993a,
1993b, 1993c; Klein, Loftus, & Plog, 1992; Klein, Loftus, Trafton,
& Fuhrman, 1992).
Finally, as noted earlier, work by Klein and Loftus and their
colleagues (e.g., Klein et al., 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein,
Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; see also Baxter & Goldberg,
1987; Sande, 1990; Sande, Goethals, & Radloff, 1988; Smith,
1990) has shown that trait self-knowledge is represented in sum-
mary form across levels of trait descriptiveness. Accordingly, we
predicted that the above effects should occur regardless of whether
the trait being judged fell in the high, medium, or low self-
descriptiveness category.
As Figure 1 shows, the results fully supported these predictions.
First, we found strong evidence that trait judgments activated
trait-inconsistent episodes: Regardless of level of trait-descrip-
tiveness, subjects were significantly faster to perform the recall
task when the initial task was describe than when it was define.
Second, trait judgments did not activate trait-consistent epi-
sodes. Replicating findings from previous studies (e.g., Klein et
al., 1989, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993b; Klein, Loftus,
Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992), the time taken to perform a recall task
for trait-consistent episodes was not differentially influenced by
the previous performance of a describe task or a define task.
Again, this was regardless of whether traits fell in the high,
medium, or low descriptiveness categories.
An additional perspective on whether making trait judgments
activates trait-inconsistent episodes in tandem with summaries can
be obtained by seeing whether recall latencies following the de-
scribe task are shorter for inconsistent episodes than for consistent
ones. According to the scope hypothesis, trait self-descriptive-
ness judgments should activate trait-inconsistent, but not trait-
consistent, behavioral episodes. This leads to the counterintuitive
prediction that subjects should recall a behavior more quickly
when its trait implications are opposite those of the trait judged
during an initial describe task than when they are the same as those
of the trait judged initially. Consistent with this prediction, sub-
jects took significantly less time to recall a behavior when it
exemplified the antonym of the trait judged during an initial
describe task than when it exemplified the same trait as that judged
during an initial describe task.
In other words, we found that deciding whether a trait describes
oneself facilitates retrieval of trait-inconsistent episodes, which
suggests that these judgments activate memories of behaviors
inconsistent with the trait being judged (Klein et al., 2001). By
contrast, we found no evidence that trait self-descriptiveness judg-
ments facilitated retrieval of trait-consistent episodes. From this
Figure 1. Activating a trait summary about the self can prime episodic
memory: self-study. Deciding whether a trait describes oneself activates
episodes that are inconsistent with the trait asked about. Trait-consistent
episodes are not primed. This holds whether the subject views the trait as
highly descriptive or not. Negative numbers indicate that the episode was
recalled faster than in a control condition. RT  reaction time.
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we infer that decisions about whether a trait describes oneself do
not activate trait-consistent behavioral memories. That trait-
inconsistent (but not trait-consistent) episodic memories are
primed by retrieval of a trait summary from semantic memory is
just what one would expect if the scope hypothesis were correct.
The Mother Study
Our second study (Klein et al., 2001) had two purposes. First,
we wanted to extend the generality of the scope hypothesis by
testing whether judgments about a well-known other also conform
to its predictions. Second, we wanted to address one interesting
result from our first study—the finding that activation of trait-
inconsistent behaviors occurred regardless of whether the trait
judged fell in the high, medium, or low self-descriptiveness cate-
gories. This finding can be accommodated within the scope hy-
pothesis by assuming that trait knowledge about the self is repre-
sented in summary form across levels of trait self-descriptiveness.
Although there is a body of evidence consistent with this assump-
tion (e.g., Klein et al., 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus,
Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Sande, 1990; Sande et al., 1988), we
nonetheless felt it appropriate to conduct a more stringent test by
examining recall task latencies under circumstances where there
are strong a priori reasons for assuming the presence or absence of
trait summaries. After all, the scope hypothesis asserts that the
function of priming inconsistent episodes is to place boundary
conditions on the scope of a semantic summary. If no trait sum-
mary exists, then there is no generalization whose scope needs to
be delimited. As discussed below, trait judgments about a well-
known other provide exactly the conditions we need to test this
prediction.
The mental representation of trait knowledge about other per-
sons. Earlier, we described the Klein and Loftus model for the
representation of trait knowledge about the self. Recently, Klein,
Loftus, and colleagues proposed that this same model can be
extended to describe the mental representation of trait knowledge
about others (e.g., Babey et al., 1998; Klein & Loftus, 1993b;
Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Sherman & Klein,
1994). According to the model, one’s representation of a person’s
traits varies with the amount of experience one has had with that
person. If the amount of experience is not sufficient to support
abstraction, then trait knowledge will be represented only at the
level of behavioral memories. Trait judgments about the person,
therefore, must be based on inceptive behavioral memories—that
is, on episodes. However, as the amount of experience becomes
sufficiently large, trait knowledge is increasingly likely to be
abstracted and represented in summary form. When this happens,
trait judgments may be made by directly accessing the appropriate
derived memory representation—a trait summary. Thus, the model
proposes that the more knowledge one has about a person’s be-
havior, the more likely one is to have formed summary represen-
tations and the less likely one is to base judgments of that person
on memories of specific behavioral episodes (for similar views, see
N. H. Anderson, 1989; Park, 1986).
A series of studies by Klein and Loftus and their colleagues has
provided evidence largely consistent with their model (Babey et
al., 1998; Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhr-
man, 1992, Experiment 1; Sherman & Klein, 1994). In one study
(Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Experiment 1), in
which the target person was the subject’s mother, subjects first
completed a series of priming trials and then rated each stimulus
trait for the degree to which it described their mothers. Klein,
Loftus, Trafton, and Fuhrman found no evidence that a describe
task facilitated retrieval of trait-consistent behavioral episodes
when the trait in question was highly descriptive of one’s mother.
However, they found considerable evidence of facilitation when
traits were rated medium in mother descriptiveness. To explain
these findings, Klein, Loftus, Trafton, and Fuhrman (1992; see
also Klein & Loftus, 1993b) proposed that traits rated highly
descriptive of another person are those that he or she has mani-
fested most often, and hence are those for which subjects have
observed a relatively large number of behaviors. Accordingly,
highly descriptive traits are likely to be those for which subjects
have created a derived memory—a trait summary—which can be
accessed to perform the describe task. Because memories of trait-
consistent behavioral episodes would not be activated, the describe
task would be no more beneficial than a define task to the subse-
quent performance of a recall task.
In contrast, medium-descriptive traits are likely to be those for
which subjects have observed fewer behavioral exemplars. This
means it is less likely that subjects will have a derived memory in
the form of a trait summary. In the absence of a trait summary,
subjects would have to retrieve trait-relevant behavioral memories
to make descriptiveness judgments. Consequently, a describe task
would be more beneficial than a define task in performing a
subsequent recall task, and one would observe faster retrieval of
trait-consistent episodes following a describe task. (The reason for
assuming that retrieval will be biased toward trait-consistent be-
haviors follows from research showing that people rely on
“positive-test” strategies in many tasks [e.g., Klayman & Ha,
1987; Wason, 1968], including when answering questions about
the trait characteristics of others: They are more likely to search
memory for examples of the trait being judged than for examples
of its opposite; e.g., Devine, Hirt, & Gehrke, 1990; Fong &
Markus, 1982; Snyder & Cantor, 1979.)
Thus, consistent with the predictions of the Klein, Loftus,
Trafton, and Fuhrman (1992) model, for judgments about mother,
trait-consistent behavioral episodes appear to be required when the
trait being judged is medium in mother descriptiveness but not
when the trait being judged is highly descriptive of mother. (No
clear prediction can be made for low-descriptive traits; for reasons,
see Klein et al., 2001; Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus,
Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992.)
Testing the scope hypothesis when trait summaries are present
and absent: Predictions. The results just described show that the
mental representation of mother’s traits varies with trait descrip-
tiveness: Knowledge of highly descriptive traits consists of derived
memories—abstract trait generalizations—whereas knowledge of
medium-descriptive traits consists of inceptive memories of spe-
cific behavioral episodes. For exactly this reason, however, the
scope hypothesis makes different predictions for mother’s high-
and medium-descriptive traits. When a trait summary exists (as it
does for highly descriptive traits), the results from a decision task
involving one’s mother should exactly parallel those from the self
study: Performance of an initial describe task should facilitate the
recall of trait-inconsistent behaviors, but not trait-consistent ones.
But when there is no trait summary whose scope needs to be
delimited (as for mother’s medium-descriptive traits), trait-
inconsistent episodes should not be primed (i.e., an initial describe
task should not facilitate the recall of trait-inconsistent behaviors).
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Instead, one should expect priming of trait-consistent behavioral
episodes because these are necessary for making a judgment when
no summary exists.
Our data confirmed these predictions (see Figure 2). For traits
highly descriptive of one’s mother—ones for which a summary
should exist—trait-inconsistent episodes were primed, but trait-
consistent ones were not. For traits only moderately descriptive of
one’s mother—ones for which there should be no summary—the
opposite pattern was found. Trait-inconsistent episodes were not
primed, but trait-consistent ones were.
Because the mother results allowed us to compare priming when
trait summaries are present versus absent, they provide strong
confirmation of the scope hypothesis. When a decision is made by
accessing a trait summary, search engines should simultaneously
retrieve inconsistent episodes to provide information about the
conditions under which the summary ceases to be useful. Thus,
trait-inconsistent behaviors were primed when a decision about
one’s mother was made by accessing summary representations of
her traits (the highly descriptive condition). But when summary
representations were absent—as in the medium-descriptive condi-
tion—they could play no role in decision making. This explains
why trait-inconsistent behaviors were not primed in the medium-
descriptive condition. According to the scope hypothesis, when no
generalization has been accessed during a decision task, there is no
representation whose scope needs to be delimited.
We think the results of the self and mother studies are particu-
larly interesting because they are naturalistic: The subject made
trait judgments about real individuals and real experiences. It bears
mentioning, however, that priming of trait-inconsistent behavioral
episodes following activation of a trait summary also has been
found when subjects make judgments about meaningful groups as
well as artificial target individuals created in the laboratory (Babey
et al., 1998). Indeed, Babey et al. (1998) found this effect to be
highly replicable—it was confirmed in six separate studies and
never disconfirmed.
General Discussion
A great deal of memory research is designed to illuminate the
design features of memory systems, including their relationships to
one another. It has been clear for a long time that processes within
a memory system can operate independently of one another: For
example, damage to the hippocampus selectively impairs the pro-
cesses that encode and store new information, leaving retrieval
processes intact (e.g., Graham & Hodges, 1997; Squire & Knowl-
ton, 1995; Staubli & Lynch, 1987). It has recently been suggested
that relationships between different memory systems are process
specific as well: According to Tulving’s (1995b) serial-parallel-
independence (SPI) model, there is a serial relationship between
semantic and episodic memory when it comes to encoding (epi-
sodic encoding depends on prior semantic encoding), a parallel
relationship when it comes to storage, and functional independence
when it comes to retrieval.
We have proposed that this insight about process specificity be
carried one step further, to recognize that not all retrieval processes
are the same. Each decision rule should have a search engine that
is designed to retrieve adaptively appropriate information. Because
each decision rule has a different adaptive function, each will have
different informational needs: One may require information from
semantic memory alone, another from episodic memory alone, and
yet another from both. As a result, retrieval from semantic and
episodic memory should be independent in some decision contexts
but not in others. When it comes to retrieval, there should be no
invariant relationship between the semantic and episodic memory
systems.
More specifically, we argued that generalizations from semantic
memory allow speedy decisions, but at the cost of accuracy,
whereas episodic memories provide accurate—that is, situationally
specific—information, but at the cost of speed. Both speed and
accuracy can be engineered into a decision-making system, how-
ever, if the system is designed to retrieve both kinds of information
in the right combination. A generalization is most useful when its
scope is delimited: when it is accompanied by information speci-
fying those situations in which it does not apply. Episodic mem-
ories that are inconsistent with the generalization can serve this
function because they are broad-band encodings of specific situ-
ations in which the generalization fails to predict the outcome. This
task analysis suggests the following: To render judgments that are
both fast and accurate, a decision rule needs a search engine that
looks for summary information in semantic memory and, on re-
trieving it, also looks for episodic memories that are inconsistent
with that summary—ones that place boundary conditions on the
summary’s scope. We called this the scope hypothesis.
In support of this argument, we discussed data from experiments
on trait judgment. A large body of existing research had already
shown that when asked to decide whether a trait describes oneself
(e.g., “Does this describe you: friendly?”), subjects retrieve a
derived memory—a trait summary—from semantic memory. It
was also known that, in this decision context, retrieving a trait
summary does not activate episodic memories in which the subject
manifested behavior that is consistent with the trait under consid-
eration. Therefore, when it comes to behavioral episodes whose
Figure 2. Activating a trait summary about another person primes incon-
sistent episodes: mother study. Deciding whether a trait describes one’s
mother activates episodes that are inconsistent with the trait asked about
only when the trait is highly descriptive of one’s mother. When it is only
moderately descriptive, trait-consistent episodes are primed. This is con-
sistent with the notion that subjects have formed summaries only for traits
they consider highly descriptive of their mothers. Negative numbers indi-
cate that the episode was recalled faster than in a control condition. RT 
reaction time.
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content is trait consistent, retrieval from semantic and episodic
memory is functionally independent. Retrieving a trait summary
from semantic memory does not prime trait-consistent episodic
memories.
We found, however, that this result does not generalize to
trait-inconsistent episodes. On the basis of the scope hypothesis,
we made the following prediction: When a decision rule designed
to make trait judgments about a person succeeds in retrieving a
trait summary from semantic memory, it will also retrieve episodic
memories of incidents in which that person exhibited behaviors
that are inconsistent with that trait. This is because the decision
rule is designed to place boundary conditions on the scope of the
generalization. We tested this prediction by using a priming par-
adigm and a decision task in which one is asked whether a trait
describes oneself. As the scope hypothesis predicts, retrieving a
trait summary primed trait-inconsistent episodes but not trait-
consistent ones. This was not the case in other decision contexts:
Asking a subject to simply define a trait—a context that does not
cause retrieval of a trait summary (Klein et al., 1989, 1997; Klein
& Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, & Plog, 1992; Klein, Loftus,
Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Schell et al., 1996)—primes neither
trait-consistent nor trait-inconsistent episodes.
We demonstrated the generality of this hypothesis by showing
that it extends to judgments of others, in this case the subject’s
mother. Previous research indicates that subjects do have summary
representations for traits they consider highly descriptive of their
mothers but not of ones they consider only moderately descriptive.
Thus, by comparing episode retrieval times for highly descriptive
versus medium-descriptive traits, we were able to test the hypoth-
esis that trait-inconsistent episodes are primed only if a trait
summary is retrieved. In accordance with the scope hypothesis,
trait-inconsistent episodes were primed for traits highly descriptive
of mother but not for medium-descriptive traits. Trait-consistent
episodes were primed only for medium-descriptive traits—ones
for which the subject appeared to lack a summary representation.
This last finding is consistent with the hypothesis that, in the
absence of a trait summary, subjects make trait judgments by
consulting inceptive memories, following a positive test strategy
(as they do in many domains; Klayman & Ha, 1987).
In short, by considering when a decision task would access a
generalization whose scope needs to be bound, we were able to
predict when retrieval of relevant knowledge from semantic mem-
ory would be functionally independent of retrieval from episodic
memory and when it would not.
Is Priming Functional?
Tulving (1995b) has argued that perceptual priming is the ex-
pression of an adaptation designed to facilitate the identification of
“the same or a similar object on a subsequent occasion, in the sense
that the identification of the object requires less stimulus informa-
tion or occurs more quickly than it does in the absence of priming”
(p. 841). J. R. Anderson and Milson (1989) also view priming as
functional. Just as vision scientists once used the design features of
a camera to illuminate the design features of the eye, J. R. Ander-
son and Milson perceptively used the design features of library
systems and computerized databases to illuminate the design fea-
tures of priming in memory. For example, in libraries and com-
puterized data retrieval systems, the best predictor of whether a
piece of information will be useful in the future is the fact that it
was recently used (e.g., books that were recently checked out of
the library are more likely to be checked out again than books that
have not been checked out for a long time). For this reason,
libraries and computer databases are organized such that recently
accessed items of information are easier to retrieve than ones that
have not been accessed for a long time. J. R. Anderson and Milson
proposed that priming—whether perceptual or memorial—is the
expression of an adaptation designed to promote the fast retrieval
of useful information by exploiting the basic predictive relation-
ship in the world between the frequency and timing of past use and
the probability of future use.
We strongly agree that the phenomenon of recent exposure
speeding recognition or retrieval is an adaptation that has evolved
because of its functional consequences. We began by proposing a
functional explanation for the observed phenomenon of priming.
According to this view, priming is the result of the designed
expediting of information or accessibility to mechanisms on the
basis of the probability that the class of information will be useful,
and we view prior use as simply one cue of future utility. This
raises the possibility that there is a far larger class of computational
mechanisms that evolved to cause information expediting than
those that operate by prior exposure: Each cue that reliably pre-
dicts that a certain kind of information will be useful to a certain
kind of decision rule or inference system potentially could serve as
the basis for the evolution of a new mechanism for accelerating the
accessibility of that category of information to the procedures that
require it. Measurement of such facilitation provides the experi-
mental entry point into exploring the potentially heterogeneous,
functionally specialized design features of these search engines. In
the self and mother experiments we demonstrated the existence of
at least one additional variety of priming that operates on an
entirely different—yet still functionally advantageous—principle:
scope limitation.
Neither of the functions outlined by Tulving, 1995b, or J. R.
Anderson and Milson (1989) are adequate for explaining the
priming of trait-inconsistent episodes that we found in the exper-
iments discussed herein. Unlike the priming of object representa-
tions (Tulving, 1995b), no perceptual processes were involved in
our experiments, and our results do not parallel those for percep-
tual priming (we did not find that “recognizing” oneself as, say,
calm speeds recall of instances in which one was calm). The J. R.
Anderson and Milson analysis does not apply in this case, either.
The finding was not that retrieving a trait summary primes the
subsequent retrieval of that same trait summary (although this is,
in fact, true; e.g., Klein et al., 1989; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, &
Fuhrman, 1992). Nor did we find that retrieving a trait summary
primes the subsequent retrieval of trait-consistent episodes—epi-
sodes that might well have been recently used in the sense that they
contributed to the formation of that summary. The only episodes
primed by retrieving a trait summary were ones inconsistent with
it. This finding does not fit the J. R. Anderson and Milson profile:
It is like finding a library where checking out The Origins of Virtue
predicts that biographies of Hitler (but not of Mother Theresa!)
will be checked out next. In other words, if the priming found
in our experiments is the expression of the functional compo-
nent of an adaptation, we will have to look elsewhere for its
explanation.
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Is Priming an Adaptation or a By-Product?
These experiments addressed another issue in the priming con-
troversy. Although some researchers regard priming as an evolved
adaptation, others regard it as an engineering by-product. For
example, the physiological activation of neural tissue could simply
lower the threshold for its subsequent activation purely as an
accident of cell biology. Indeed, one of the basic principles of
adaptationism—the study of the functional design of naturally
selected systems—is that not all phenotypic features are func-
tional. Many features of organisms are by-products of functional
organization (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Williams, 1966).
In J. R. Anderson and Milson’s (1989) theory, there was a
sophisticated matching of data to functional theory. Nevertheless,
because by-product explanations are often vague, and can make
the same qualitative predictions as the J. R. Anderson and Milson
theory, the question persists: Is episode priming a functional com-
ponent of an adaptation or is it a by-product of one?
If one can demonstrate that priming in another domain takes
place according to an entirely different functional logic—one that
is inconsistent with any simple physiological or engineering by-
product explanation—this would undermine these by-product ex-
planations as counterhypotheses to any functional theory, includ-
ing those proposed by Tulving (1995b) and by J. R. Anderson and
Milson (1989). It would support the hypothesis that all three types
of priming are adaptations, and independent ones at that.
Design evidence is criterial. To demonstrate that an aspect of
the phenotype is an adaptation, one must first provide design
evidence: evidence that the phenotypic feature is well-engineered
for solving an adaptive problem. The criteria are similar to those
one would use to demonstrate that a human-engineered machine is
(e.g.) a TV rather than a stove (a TV has many features arranged
in a way that is well suited for transducing electromagnetic radi-
ation into a color bit map—a configuration that is unlikely to have
arisen by chance—but few features that would suit it for cooking
food). The experiments herein took a first step in that direction.
Trait judgment is an adaptive domain in which a generalization can
provide fast information to a decision rule, but only by sacrificing
information about situation specificity that could improve perfor-
mance. For adaptive problems of this kind, a well-engineered
decision rule—one that can achieve both speed and accuracy—
would have search engines that retrieve, along with a generaliza-
tion, episodes that place boundary conditions on its scope. The
experiments we reported demonstrated that trait judgments show
just this property: When a trait summary is retrieved, inconsistent
episodes, but not consistent ones, are primed. The pattern of results
is what one would expect of a priming mechanism designed to
delimit the scope of a generalization.
However, providing design evidence is not enough to demon-
strate that the machinery involved is an adaptation designed to
solve the scope problem. One must also demonstrate that the
phenotypic feature in question is not more parsimoniously ex-
plained as the by-product of some other adaptation or as a mani-
festation of incidental features or physical law. To continue the TV
analogy, there are no machines designed for sewing, cooking, or
any other purpose that just happen, by coincidence, to transduce
TV waves into displayed bit maps (leading to the confident rejec-
tion that objects that capture and display TV signals do so as a
by-product). And TVs—highly antientropic collections of mat-
ter—do not fly together as the result of Brownian motion, osmosis,
gravity, or any other known physical process or law. Can the same
be said for the machinery that caused priming of trait-inconsistent
episodes in the self and mother experiments?
Is priming a by-product of engineering constraints? The hy-
pothesis that priming is a by-product of some general engineering
constraint of the brain is easily eliminated. Many kinds of stored
representations are found in the human brain—from perceptual
representations of objects to lexemes to episodic memories—and it
is clear that there are many situations in which these are not
primed, either by previous exposure or by retrieval (and when
priming occurs, one usually sees faster retrieval of the same
representation, not of its “opposite”). For example, changing an
object’s picture-plane orientation impedes priming of perceptual
representations of objects, but changing its size does not (Bieder-
man & Cooper, 1992; Cooper, Schacter, & Moore, 1991; Cooper,
Schacter, Ballesteros, & Moore, 1992). Perhaps more importantly,
the evidence presented herein shows that episode priming after
retrieval of a trait summary cannot be a physiologically necessary
phenomenon of recent neural firing, because trait-consistent epi-
sodes are not primed.
Is priming a by-product of neural activation (spreading activa-
tion hypothesis)? Because this is a type of engineering constraint
hypothesis, the evidence above speaks against any simple version
of a neural activation hypothesis as well.
Could episode priming be a by-product of spreading activation
among semantically related items in a neural net? On this view
(e.g., J. R. Anderson, 1976, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Mc-
Namara, 1992a, 1992b), retrieving a trait summary would activate
other representations with trait-relevant semantic content. Our
evidence is not consistent with a spreading activation model.
Almost by definition, trait-consistent episodes are semantically
closer to a trait summary than inconsistent ones, yet retrieving a
trait summary does not prime consistent episodes.
Is priming a by-product of connectionist systems of trait repre-
sentation? Pattern associator models of memory and cognition
have received a lot of attention in the past two decades (McClel-
land & Rumelhart, 1986; Quinlan, 1991, 1992; Rumelhart &
McClelland, 1986). Moreover, they have many appealing features
as models for how at least some memory processes might work,
including the creation of the derived summary representations
explored herein. This raises the question of whether the priming
patterns we have reported could be explained as a natural by-
product of this kind of architecture.
It is difficult to see how this could be so. In essence, such
architectures operate by computing similarities. Although trait-
inconsistent episodes share similarities with the summary repre-
sentation, they obviously share fewer similarities than trait-
consistent episodes do, and therefore, trait-consistent episodes
should be primed by summary representations to a greater degree
than trait-inconsistent episodes. We did not observe this. More-
over, it is difficult to see how the same pattern associator model
could produce priming of trait-consistent episodes when subjects
are asked about medium-descriptive traits of others, but trait-
inconsistent episodes when asked about highly descriptive traits.
Although it would be premature, given the great diversity of
existing and potential connectionist models, to conclude that it is
impossible to contrive connectionist systems that could produce
such outcomes, it seems safe to suggest that this pattern of results
is unlikely to be a natural by-product of any pattern associator
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model not specifically built to incorporate something similar to the
functional principles of priming outlined here.
Is priming a by-product of a fan effect? According to fan
effect models, a representation must receive a certain amount of
“activation” if it is to be consciously retrieved (e.g., J. R. Ander-
son, 1974, 1976, 1983; Moeser, 1979; Thorndyke & Bower, 1974).
A proponent of fan effect models might try to explain the results
as follows: Suppose that, for traits that are highly self-descriptive,
one’s episodic memory contains more trait-consistent episodes
than trait-inconsistent ones. Assume further that when one is asked
to retrieve a certain kind of episode, a given amount of “activation”
is spread among all of the exemplars. Let’s say the episodic store
contains 100 trait-consistent episodes and 10 trait-inconsistent
episodes. When asked to retrieve a trait-consistent episode, each
incident would acquire 1/100 of the total activation; when asked to
retrieve a trait-inconsistent episode, each incident would acquire
1/10 of the total activation. Because each trait-inconsistent episode
would have 10 times the activation of each trait-consistent one,
trait-inconsistent episodes are more likely to be primed. This
would explain why, when subjects are asked to retrieve episodes
relevant to traits that are highly self-descriptive, trait-inconsistent
episodes, but not trait-consistent ones, are activated. It could also
explain why one finds a different priming pattern in the mother
experiment. The subject’s memory for episodes involving mother
would include many fewer trait-consistent episodes for medium-
descriptive traits than for highly descriptive ones. Hence, when the
subject is asked about highly mother-descriptive traits, trait-
inconsistent episodes should be primed. But trait-consistent epi-
sodes should be primed when he or she is asked about medium
mother-descriptive traits.
There are a number of problems with this account. First and
foremost, there is strong empirical evidence against fan effect
models, especially for trait judgment (Babey et al., 1998; Sherman
& Klein, 1994). Second, this account depends on the assumption
that trait-consistent episodes vastly outnumber trait-inconsistent
ones in the episodic memory system. Although this might be true
for highly self-descriptive traits, it is unlikely to be true for
medium and low descriptive traits. After all, subjects judged that
some of the traits were “extremely unlike me” (low descriptive).
For traits “extremely unlike me,” the person’s episodic store
should contain more trait-inconsistent episodes than trait-
consistent ones. Fan effect accounts would have to predict priming
of trait-consistent episodes for low descriptive traits, and priming
of trait-inconsistent episodes for highly descriptive traits. Such
predictions were falsified: Inconsistent episodes were primed, and
consistent episodes were not primed, no matter how self-
descriptive a person judged a trait term to be.
A third reason to doubt this account is that it does not explain
why priming of inconsistent episodes occurs when the subject
makes a describe judgment but not when the subject performs
other semantically related tasks (such as a define task) or, indeed,
no initial task at all (Babey et al., 1998; Klein et al., 2001). To
account for the results, the fan effect model must posit that the
burst of activation is sent when subjects face the second task,
which is the recall task, and not before. This is what ensures that
the burst is sent only to (e.g.) friendly episodes, and not to
unfriendly ones, when subjects are asked to recall episodes in
which they were friendly. (Otherwise, the burst would be spread
among all n semantically related episodes, inconsistent or not; each
incident would get a charge of 1/n, and inconsistent episodes
would have no activation advantage.) This means the initial task
must be irrelevant. But if the first task is irrelevant, then the fan
effect cannot explain why the priming of inconsistent episodes for
the self occurs after a describe task, but not after a define task.
Indeed, proponents of the fan effect would have to predict that, for
highly descriptive traits, inconsistent episodes would be recalled
faster than consistent ones even if there were no initial task at all.
After all, if there are 10 inconsistent episodes and 100 consistent
ones, the charge on each inconsistent one would be 10 times
greater than the charge on each consistent one, regardless of any
task the subject performs before being asked to recall an episode.
Yet inconsistent episodes are not recalled faster than consistent
ones in the absence of an initial task (e.g., Babey et al., 1998; Klein
et al., 2001).
Lastly, the data on mother judgments are not consistent with the
fan effect either. Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile the mother
results with the self results given that view. Let’s say, for example,
that trait-consistent episodes are primed in the mother experiment
for medium-descriptive traits because for these traits, there are
many inconsistent episodes and few consistent ones (otherwise the
trait would be judged “highly descriptive of mother”). If so, then
the same should be true for the medium descriptive traits in the self
study, and we would have seen priming of trait-consistent episodes
for those traits as well. But this was not the case: Trait-inconsistent
episodes were primed for all the self judgments, regardless of how
self-descriptive the subject judged the trait queried to be. One
could escape this contradiction by assuming that, compared with
episodes about the self, the subject has stored many fewer epi-
sodes—whether trait-consistent or not—about his or her mother.
But if there are a small number of episodes, then each should be
able to get a sizable dose of activation. As a result, both trait-
consistent and trait-inconsistent episodes would be primed in the
medium-descriptive mother condition. Yet trait-inconsistent epi-
sodes were not primed at all in that condition.
For these reasons, we conclude that the priming we found in
these experiments is the functional product of evolved adaptations
designed to expedite information accessibility rather than a by-
product of the cognitive architecture. The fact that all of the
by-product explanations we considered fail to account for our data
has wider implications, however. Existing by-product explana-
tions, by their nature, predict priming in all domains, regardless of
content. They contain no mechanism for producing priming of,
say, object representations, but not of trait episodes. Therefore, if
they fail to account for one domain, they fail as explanations and
can be eliminated as viable counterexplanations for the functional
theories of priming proposed by J. R. Anderson and Milson (1989),
Tulving (1995b), and ourselves.
Conclusions
Toward a General Model of Trait Knowledge
The relation between trait summary knowledge and summary-
consistent behavioral memories. The results from the present
studies, taken together with the supporting body of preceding
research (e.g., Babey, et al., 1998; Craik et al., 1999; Hirshman &
Lanning, 1999; Kircher et al., 2000; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1998;
Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993a, 1993b; Klein et al., 1989, 1993,
1997; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996; Klein, Loftus, & Plog,
1992; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Klein, Sherman,
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& Loftus, 1996; Lord, 1993; Schell et al., 1996; Sherman et al.,
1998; Sherman & Klein, 1994; Tulving, 1993a) allow construction
of a framework of inferences concerning the relation between
summary-consistent behaviors and trait summary knowledge.
First, this body of research supports the view (e.g., Kihlstrom &
Klein, 1994; Klein, 1999; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1998; Klein &
Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996) that decision
rules designed to render judgments about social entities (self,
others, groups) recruit information from two distinct types of
memory: an episodic store, which represents specific events and
behaviors involving the target, and a semantic store, which in-
cludes summaries of the target’s personality traits abstracted from
the set of particular events that served as input to the procedures
that generated the trait summary (see also Schank, 1982; Tulving,
1993a). Trait knowledge based on individual events and trait
knowledge consisting of trait summaries are independently repre-
sented and independently used (e.g., Craik et al., 1999; Hirshman
& Lanning, 1999; Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994; Klein et al., 1989,
1997; Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom,
1996; Klein, Loftus, & Plog, 1992; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, &
Fuhrman, 1992), although under certain circumstances both may
be deployed during a given judgment (e.g., Babey et al., 1998;
Klein et al., 2001; Klein, Sherman, & Loftus, 1996).
Second, once a summary representation has formed, judgments
about a person’s traits typically are made on the basis of this
abstract knowledge (e.g., Babey et al., 1998; Budesheim & Bon-
nelle, 1998; Klein et al., 1989, 1993, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a,
1993b; Klein, Loftus, & Plog, 1992; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, &
Fuhrman, 1992; Klein, Sherman, & Loftus, 1996; Lord, 1993;
Sherman & Klein, 1994). In fact, given the existence of a summary
trait representation, specific memories in which the person mani-
fested behavior consistent with a trait summary appear to play
little, if any, role in trait judgments (e.g., Buss & Craik, 1984;
Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981; Epstein, 1979; Klein et al., 1993; Klein
& Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Schell
et al., 1996; Tranel & Damasio, 1993; but see Klein, Sherman, &
Loftus, 1996, for an important qualification).
Thus, when it comes to retrieving behavioral episodes whose
content is summary consistent, retrieval from the episodic and
semantic stores appears to be functionally independent. By this we
mean that the operations of the semantic store do not require the
operations of the episodic store (e.g., Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994,
1997; Klein et al., 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993b; Klein, Loftus, &
Kihlstrom, 1996; Tulving, 1983).
The relation between summary-inconsistent behavioral memo-
ries and trait summary knowledge. The present research indi-
cates that these conclusions do not generalize to summary-
inconsistent behavioral episodes. Specifically, we have shown that
when a judgment retrieves a trait summary from memory, it also
retrieves memories of specific instances in which behavior was
inconsistent with that summary (Babey et al., 1998; Klein et al.,
2001). Thus, absolute statements about the independence between
the episodic and semantic stores may not be possible: One finds
independence in some domains but not in others.
Is the Priming of Inconsistent Events Restricted to the
Domain of Trait Judgment?
Perhaps because it seems so counterintuitive, the possibility that
trait judgments call to mind memories of trait-inconsistent behav-
iors had not been examined empirically before the studies reported
herein. However, theoretical developments in three different re-
search domains—script-based learning (e.g., Schank, 1982),
schema-driven memory (e.g., Graesser, 1981), and object catego-
rization (e.g., Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994)—hint
strongly at the possibility that similar phenomena will be found in
domains other than trait judgment.
The relation between summary knowledge and memory for
specific episodes is a central theme of Schank’s work on script-
based comprehension and learning (e.g., Schank, 1980, 1982;
Schank & Abelson, 1977). Schank proposed that when events of a
similar class repeat themselves a sufficient number of times, they
are assimilated into a knowledge structure he called a script.
Scripts store generalizations abstracted from repeated experiences
of similar events but fail to preserve the specific details of any
particular occurrence of those events. They do, however, preserve
information about specific events that deviate from the expecta-
tions generated by the script.
The special status Schank accorded expectancy-violating events
in the representation of script knowledge derived from their role in
his theory of failure-driven learning (e.g., Schank, 1980, 1982).
According to Schank, the generalizations contained in a script
enable a person to know what to expect and how to behave when
he or she encounters similar events. However, although these
expectations usually are accurate, they occasionally turn out to be
wrong. When this happens, it is important that the learner remem-
ber the events that led to the failed expectations so better predic-
tions can be made next time the same situation arises. Scripts
accomplish this by storing a record of the specific events that
caused the failure, which is activated along with general script
knowledge when similar situations are encountered. Schank’s rea-
soning was very similar to that which led us to propose the scope
hypothesis to explain why trait-inconsistent episodes are primed
when a trait summary is retrieved. In our terms, scripts would be
a type of derived memory, and the expectancy-violating events
would be inceptive memories that are coretrieved to bound the
scope of the script’s generalizations. When retrieved together, they
provide a good combination of speed plus accuracy.
Expectancy-violating events also receive special treatment in
several schema models of memory. For example, Bartlett’s (1932)
“schema with correction” model proposes that the mental repre-
sentation of a class of similar events consists of a set of general-
izations called a schema along with which are stored specific
deviations from the information contained in the schema (see also
Woodworth, 1938). A more recent adaptation of these ideas was
Graesser’s “schema pointer plus tag” model (e.g., Graesser, 1981;
Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, &
Smith, 1980; Smith & Graesser, 1981; see also Hudson, 1986).
According to this model, a schema contains summary information
about the typical attributes and relations that exist among a class of
similar events plus a set of tags that index specific episodes
inconsistent with, or atypical of, the summary knowledge con-
tained in the schema. These tagged episodes are retrieved when the
schema is activated in memory. Again, the schema is a type of
derived memory, and the inconsistent episodes are inceptive mem-
ories that bound its scope.
Some recent models of category learning also posit a special
status for expectancy violations in the representation of category
knowledge. For example, the RULEX model proposed by Nosof-
sky et al. (1994; see also Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995) claims that
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people form abstract, logical rules for categorizing objects through
a process of hypothesis testing. However, when an instance occurs
that cannot be predicted by those rules, it is stored in memory
along with the general rule. People access the rule, along with any
exceptions, when making subsequent categorization decisions (for
related ideas, see Chumbley, 1986).
Although we outlined the scope problem in the context of trait
judgment, it arises in many domains (for discussion, see Cosmides
& Tooby, 2000). In the first three cases discussed above, the joint
retrieval of a generalization with exceptions to it can be seen as a
solution to the scope problem. The generalization provides fast
access to information with some predictive validity, and the ex-
ceptions enhance accuracy by providing boundary conditions on
the scope of the generalization.
One would not expect to see the same pattern across all do-
mains, however. For example, models of how native English
speakers learn the use of the past tense (e.g., Brown, 1973; Cazden,
1968; Kuczaj, 1977; Pinker, 1994) bear some interesting similar-
ities to the memory models we have been discussing. According to
these models, children hear examples of grammatically correct
language (need–needed, help–helped), from which they infer a
general past-tense rule (i.e., to make past tense, add ed to the stem).
They next pass through a phase in which they occasionally make
errors by overgeneralizing the rule to newly acquired irregular
verbs (e.g., go–goed, catch–catched). These errors occur when the
child fails to retrieve from memory an irregular past tense form
(Marcus et al., 1992). In first-language learners, the memory
retrieval failure occurs because the child has heard the new word
so few times, but such failures can also occur in adults (especially
those with organic memory impairments): When they do, the
adults over-regularize as well (Ullman et al., 1997).
Appropriate use of the past tense eventually is accomplished
when children learn to store in memory both a general past tense
rule as well as a record of specific exceptions to that rule (Pinker,
1991, 1999). These exceptions delimit the scope of the past-tense
rule. But note that the order of activation goes in the opposite
direction from that for trait judgment. Activation of trait summa-
ries activates inconsistent episodes, but activation of the (regular)
past-tense rule does not activate irregular exceptions. Instead,
activation of an irregular exception blocks the activation of the
past-tense rule (Aronoff, 1976). This difference makes sense: In
trait judgment, the summary is activated because one is using it to
make predictions, but no adaptive function is served by activating
a past-tense rule when an irregular past-tense form has already
been retrieved.
One should also expect a different pattern for generalizations
that are always true and for situations in which exceptions do not
illuminate a generalization’s boundary conditions. Inconsistent
episodes should not be primed by retrieval of generalizations that
have always been true over evolutionary time and that have come
to be embodied in neural specializations. For example, even at 3
months of age, infants assume that two solid objects cannot pass
through one another (Baillargeon, 1986; Spelke, 1990), and sleight
of hand is required to make it appear otherwise. But it would be
very strange to find that whenever an adult sees two solid objects
approach one another—a softball approaching a bat or two cars on
a collision course—episodic memories of expectancy-violating
magic acts are primed. By the same token, one would not expect
retrieval of generalizations to prime inconsistent episodes in do-
mains where, during human evolutionary history, it would not
have helped: Chaotic systems, such as weather (in the absence of
modern meteorology), might be an example. Exceptions may
lower your confidence that a predicted event will occur, but they
do not illuminate the conditions under which the generalization
does not hold.7
Implications for Studying the Architecture of Memory
Dissociations in retrieval have been used as evidence in support
of the existence of multiple memory systems (for reviews, see
Foster & Jelicic, 1999; Polster et al., 1991; Schacter & Buckner,
1998; Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Squire, 1992). Do the results of
the experiments reported herein mean that we need to abandon the
idea of separate memory systems? After all, we have shown that
there are decision tasks in which retrieval of episodic knowledge is
linked to, rather than independent of, retrieval of semantic knowl-
edge. Does this finding mean that semantic and episodic memories
do not reside in two separate memory systems? (For debate, see
Squire, 1994; Tulving, 1993b.)
No. In particularly severe cases of the classic amnesic syn-
drome, patients can still retrieve semantic knowledge, but episodic
memories cannot be retrieved no matter what decision task is
employed (e.g., Cermak, 1984; Kitchener, Hodges, & McCarthy,
1998; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, in press; Markowitsch et al.,
1993; Milner, Corkin & Teuber, 1968; Tulving, 1989, 1993a;
Tulving, Hayman, & MacDonald, 1991; Vargha-Khadem et al.,
1997; Wilson & Wearing, 1995; Wood, Brown, & Felton, 1989).
That access to episodes can be knocked out across decision con-
texts, while semantic access is spared, implies that there are,
indeed, separate “archives” for episodic and semantic memories.
The results we have presented imply a more complex view.
Imagine a library that has a number of different collections, each
of which archives a different category of information. It would be
surprising if every scholar who uses the library were to access one,
and only one, of these collections. This is because each scholar is
trying to solve a different problem: The scholar studying sexual
mores in Victorian England would be retrieving items from both
the special collection on Victorian erotica and general histories of
England; the labor economist might only retrieve summary statis-
tics on employment compiled by government sources; the biogra-
pher might retrieve only letters from the library’s collection of
correspondence between John and Abigail Adams. Whether re-
trieval is from just one archive or from several would vary de-
pending on the purpose of each investigator. The situation in a
brain-intact individual is analogous: Whether retrieval is from just
the semantic archive, just the episodic archive, or both should vary
depending on the adaptive problem that each decision rule that
accesses stored information was designed to solve.
This view also carries implications for understanding people
who have experienced brain damage. Although some conditions
may eradicate access to an entire archive, other conditions might
spare the archive while damaging a particular decision rule or
7 For example, remembering episodes in which rain did not come,
despite the presence of dark clouds, may lower your confidence in dark
clouds as a good predictor of rain. But such episodes are unlikely to
illuminate the conditions under which the generalization “dark clouds
predict rain” fails to hold. (By contrast, if one were trying to decide
whether dark clouds are a good predictor of rain, one might want to recall
both examples and counterexamples.)
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search engine that uses it (Eustache et al., 1999). Returning to the
library analogy, instead of losing a particular collection to a fire,
one investigator who uses a collection might be harmed, while a
different investigator, who uses that same collection, might emerge
from the fire unscathed. This raises the possibility of complexly
patterned amnesias, where a memory archive can be accessed in
some decision contexts but not in others. There do appear to be
patterns of brain damage that disrupt a person’s ability to make
decisions in some domains but not in others (e.g., Cappa, Frugoni,
Pasquali, Perani, & Zorat, 1998; Damasio, 1994; McCarthy &
Warrington, 1992; Sirigu & Grafman, 1996; Suzuki, Yamadori, &
Fugii, 1997; Warrington & Shallice, 1984), lending credence to
this possibility. There are also cases in which brain damage creates
very content-specific patterns of nonretrieval for lexical knowl-
edge—patients who (for example) can name and describe animals
and artifacts but not fruits and vegetables (for review, see Car-
amazza & Shelton, 1998). Some category-specific deficits might
result from the destruction of a content-specific archive (of animal
names, for example; see Caramazza, Hillis, Leek, & Miozzo,
1994). But others may involve damage to decision rules that access
these archives. The case of M.D., who had difficulty naming fruits
and vegetables, but not other categories, is suggestive: Although
M.D. could not (for example) name a peach when shown one,
when asked, “Show me the peach,” he could point to the correct
fruit (Hart, Berndt, & Caramazza, 1985). That he could recognize
the word indicates that the lexical entry was intact, even though he
could not access it in other decision contexts.
A view that emphasizes the adaptive function of decision rules
requires that care be taken in analyzing what these functions might
be. Restricting our attention once again to trait judgment, we
would like to point out that scope problems are only one class of
adaptive problem that can be solved by a system that primes
trait-inconsistent episodes. There may be many other social infer-
ence tasks that would produce similar—or contrasting—phenom-
ena. It would be particularly interesting to investigate episode
priming in the context of discourse processing, especially in argu-
ments. Imagine, for example, that you believe yourself to be
honest. In the experiments reported above, one would expect
retrieval of that summary to prime trait-inconsistent episodes. But
suppose you are engaged in an argument with someone who has
just accused you of being dishonest. Episodes in which you were
honest may leap to mind, even though these are consistent with
your own self-assessment. After all, they are inconsistent with
your accuser’s assessment of you, and that assessment is the topic
that your antagonist has raised.
There may, in fact, be many social contexts in which a well-
engineered response system would have ready access to episodes
that contradict—or support—the trait or generalization under dis-
cussion. A system that is well engineered for navigating the social
world might be designed to prime different kinds of episodes,
depending on the type of social negotiation at hand. By analyzing
such contexts, one should be able to make principled predictions
about the circumstances under which both consistent and incon-
sistent episodes will be primed.
To do so, however, we must change the way we think about
memory in two fundamental ways. First, we must abandon the
assumption of function generality that has typified the memory
literature. Second, we must remember that decision rules had to
coevolve with search engines and memory systems, and that what
kind of information they will retrieve will depend on what adaptive
problem they were designed to solve. In short, we must be willing
to consider the possibility that natural selection has created ma-
chinery that can elegantly solve a far wider array of adaptive
problems than we have yet been able to imagine.
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